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After decades of receiving a lot of attention on the epistemological level, 
the so-called ‘problem of intuitions’ is now in the center of debates on the 
metaphilosophical level. One of the reasons for this lies in the unfruit-
fulness of the epistemological discussions that recently subsided with-
out producing any signifi cant or broadly accepted theory of intuitions. 
Consequently, the metaphilosophical level of discussion of the ‘problem 
of intuitions’ inherits the same diffi culties of the epistemological level. 
The signifi cance of Max Deutsch’s book The Myth of the Intuitive is his 
effort to resolve these problems in a clear and persuasive way. He is not 
only trying to debunk problems behind the vagueness of the ‘intuition-
talk’ by drawing important distinctions that usually go under the ra-
dar in the contemporary literature, but also develops his own account of 
philosophical methodology. In this paper I will present some of his argu-
ments against the traditional view of intuitional methodology, as well 
as his own solutions to the presented problems. Regardless of Deutsch’s 
insightful account of the ‘problem of intuitions’, I fi nd that some dif-
fi culties in his own proposal are inherited from the unresolved issues of 
intuitions on the epistemological level.
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The ‘problem of intuition’ in recent years became the center of many 
epistemological and metaphilosophical discussions mainly because of 
the rise of experimental philosophy (xphi) and many criticisms raised 
against the method of cases, i.e. the method of appealing to intuitions 
elicited by thought experiments as evidence for or against some philo-
sophical theory. The so-called negative program within the xphi got 
the most attention since their theses are the most challenging ones. In 
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a nutshell, negative program advances argumentation that intuitions, 
as used in philosophical thought experiments and hypothetical cases, 
should not be trusted nor relied on as evidence. This, rather pessimistic 
view of philosophical practice led to the increasing number of metaphi-
losophical papers and books as a response to this “restrictionist chal-
lenge” (Weinberg et al. 2010). Generally speaking, there are two most 
developed ways to respond to the restrictionist challenge. The fi rst is 
to defend intuitions viewed as a source of evidence and the distinctive 
way of doing philosophy within the analytic tradition. The second is to 
claim that xphi misconstrue the target of surveys since philosophers 
are not appealing to intuitions as evidence in thought experiments. 
Deutsch devoted his book to defend the latter view. The central idea 
he develops is that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as 
evidence in thought experiments and that this myth needs to be de-
bunked. Therefore, results of xphi’s surveys about untrustworthiness 
of intuitions as evidence are not troubling if the target of their surveys 
can be refuted. This is the strategy Deutsch advances as a part of his 
metaphilosophical account. In addition, he also elaborates his own view 
that it is arguments, rather than intuitions, that are the basis of any 
thought experiment and bearers of the evidential force. This is what I 
will call the ‘arguments instead of intuitions’ view.
I.
The fi rst chapter of the book is devoted to xphi’s theoretical framework 
and distinction between its positive and negative program, as well as 
the analysis of results of recent xphi’s studies. Negative xphi program 
rises worry about the epistemic value of philosophical intuitions due 
to their susceptibility to the truth-irrelevant factors such as cultural 
background, gender, order effect, etc. Subsequently, they take a more 
negative stance toward the traditional philosophical method of appeal-
ing to intuitions and argue that intuitions cannot be trusted or relied 
on in philosophy as evidence. Positive xphi, on the other hand, is ad-
vancing more moderate conclusions that do not condemn the use of 
intuitions in philosophy.
In developing his ‘argument instead of intuition’ account as a way of 
responding to xphi criticism, Deutsch focuses on the two most discussed 
thought experiments, Gettier cases and Kripke’s Gödel case. For him, 
Gettier cases are somehow exceptional in a sense that if there is an 
appeal to intuitions anywhere in philosophy, then it is in Gettier cas-
es. From xphi’s conclusion regarding intuitions, i.e. that not everyone 
shares Gettier’s intuition, it follows that, contrary to the established 
view in the last 50 years, Gettier has not refuted the JBT theory of 
knowledge since intuitions can not be trusted or relied on as evidence. 
Now, as Deutsch sees it, for this xphi’s argument to work experimental-
ists must assume not only that (i) philosophers are treating intuitions 
about cases as evidence, but also that (ii) intuitions are treated as es-
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sential or only evidence, which is a much stronger claim. Deutsch ar-
gues against both (i) and (ii) and concludes that negative xphi critique 
fails to debunk traditional philosophical arguments that “do not, in any 
relevant sense, depend on treating intuitions as evidence” (20). In other 
words, xphi fails to hit the target.
Deutsch substantiates his central thesis—the myth of the intui-
tive—with empirical and theoretical arguments. As he himself admits, 
he is doing this without any accepted theory of intuitions, the no-theory 
theory of intuitions, as he calls is. That way he “offers enough without 
offering too much” (29). The reason for this, according to Deutsch, is 
that accepting a theory of intuitions is not necessary for asking and an-
swering questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Further-
more, any attempt to develop such a theory involves conceptual analy-
sis of intuition in terms of necessary and suffi cient conditions which 
ends up being a very diffi cult task because, ironically, every proposed 
analysis of intuition give rise to variety of counterexamples.
This looks like the right diagnosis of the current epistemological ef-
forts to provide any plausible account of intuitions. So while epistemol-
ogists and metaphilosophers are endeavoring this futile, hard-to-settle 
task, Deutsch thinks that the best strategy for asking and answering 
some crucial questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy is to 
conduct empirical investigation of the actual practice via analyzing 
original texts where some of the most infl uential thought experiments 
were presented, with no-theory theory of intuitions. The rationale be-
hind it is this:
It offers enough of an account because it allows for fruitful discussion of the 
argumentative role of intuitions. It offers not too much of an account be-
cause it does not invite the potentially endless cycle of counterexample-and-
theory-revision endemic to many attempts at conceptual analysis. (29–30)
I am inclined to say that it is questionable whether this is a tenable 
move. Although I agree with everything Deutsch says regarding diver-
sity of proposed accounts of intuitions, and unfruitfulness of the en-
deavor of analyzing the concept of intuition in terms of necessary and 
suffi cient conditions only for it to become the target of endless counter-
examples, there are some problems with no-theory theory approach. 
Particularly problematic is his claim that “a theory of the (psychologi-
cal) nature of intuitions is not required for understanding the role of 
intuition in philosophical argument” (26). The natural questions arise: 
‘How can one conduct an empirical analysis with no accepted theoreti-
cal framework of the analysandum?’, or ‘How can he or she “recognize 
an intuitive judgment when he or she encounters one” (29), if they do 
not have some general insight of what they are encountering?’.
Although Dutsch is calling his no-theory theory of intuitions the 
‘examples-plus-commonality’ theory, it is far from clear how this would 
help to answer previous questions because he is never explicit about 
what those commonalities would be. The most precise he gets is say-
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ing that examples he has in mind are those like Gettier cases, where 
certain judgments about certain hypothetical situation are made, and 
that philosophers agreed that they are intuitive judgments. And when 
analyzing suffi cient number of these examples, he is able to abstract 
commonality from them that is “relatively uncontroversial” (31). It 
seems that for Deutsch to establish the no-theory theory of intuitions 
and to investigate whether thought experiments are about intuitive 
judgments, it is enough to fi nd examples where the uncontroversial us-
age of certain judgments is present.
However, the no-theory theory does assume that we have examples of intui-
tive judgments about which those party to the debate over their role can 
agree; that is, these parties can agree that the examples are examples of 
intuitive judgments. (30)
So, the commonality among those examples is that “examples are all 
judgments about hypothetical cases and thought experiments” (32).
Diffi culty with this approach is that there is so much diversity in 
what exactly philosophers fi nd intuitive in original examples of thought 
experiments which results in diametrically different accounts of what 
intuitions are, and consequently results in diversity of the usage of 
the term ‘intuitions’. Wide arrays of views of what intuitions are lies 
between the views that they are sui generis states (e.g. Bealer 1998, 
Pust 2000), inclinations to believe (e.g. Sosa 2007) or simply beliefs 
(e.g. Lewis 1983, Jackson 1998). Or, if we have in mind views regarding 
the justifi catory status of intuitions, some philosophers hold that such 
justifi cation is a priori (e.g. Bealer 1998, BonJour 1998) and others ar-
gue that it is a posteriori (Devitt 2011, Kornblith 2007). Moreover even 
the most ‘uncontroversial’ features of intuitions, that of being sponta-
neous or noninferential, are controversial for Deutsch. He is appealing 
to Rawls’s method, which supposed to depend on intuitions, and yet 
Rawls explicitly says that the relevant judgments are our considered 
moral judgments and, therefore, cannot be spontaneous. Consequently, 
it is diffi cult to see what is the rationale for Deutsch’s thesis that phi-
losophers are not using intuitions in thought experiments, as he has no 
clear description of what precisely is that thing that philosophers are 
not appealing to.
As I see it, Deutsch cannot proceed with his endeavor just by exam-
ining thought experiments with no accepted background theory. For 
instance, if he wants to argue, as he does, that in Gettier cases there is 
no appeal to intuition that is then used as evidence, it would have to be 
clear in what sense intuition is not appealed to and used as evidence. 
Is it sui generis state, inclination to believe or simply belief or all of the 
above? So, if he claims that those things some philosophers refer to as 
‘intuitions’ are nowhere to be found in original texts, it has to be that 
he is implicitly assuming some theory of intuitions, or at least some 
characterization of them. And this I fi nd to be one of the methodological 
weaknesses of Deutsch’s strategy. In all honesty, the attempt to pro-
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vide an account of intuitions in order to show that philosophers are not 
using intuitions would not have better standing. It would be seriously 
undermined since there is no agreement of what intuitions are, so that 
would not be helpful either.
II.
For now I will set aside this methodological worry and explore the way 
Deutsch is arguing for his main thesis in the book, i.e. the evidence 
claim about intuitions. This is the central task of the chapter 2.
(EC) Many philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence.
According to Deutsch, the reason for this misconstrual of the philosoph-
ical methodology and the view that philosophers appeal to intuitions as 
evidence lies in the ambiguity of the term ‘intuition’ in (EC). To clarify 
this ambiguity he is advocating the distinction that corresponds to Ly-
can’s (1988) intuitings/intuiteds distinction, which he formulates in the 
following way:
(EC1) Many philosophical arguments treat the fact that certain con-
tents are intuitive as evidence for those very contents.
(EC2) Many philosophical arguments treat the contents of certain in-
tuitions as evidence for or against other contents.
The difference consists in the following: either it is the state of having 
an intuition or the content of the intuition that is doing the justifi cation 
of some proposition. Deutsch is claiming that a prevailing number of 
philosophers who are defending (EC) are defending it in (EC1) state-
sense, while his stand is that the only sense in which (EC) can be true, 
is (EC2) content-sense. 
When I deny that philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence, I 
mean to deny (EC1), not (EC2). According to me, very few philosophical 
arguments treat the fact that p is intuitive as evidence for p itself. (38) 
In other words, it can be asserted that philosophers rely on intuitions 
as evidence, if it means that the content of the intuition is used as evi-
dence, not the fact that one fi nds something intuitive. The step from this 
claim to the rejection of the xphi’s results is very clear. Xphi mishit the 
sense in which it is taken that philosophers appeal to intuitions as evi-
dence. Hence, their criticism does not affect philosophical method and 
in this misconception lies the myth of the intuitive, concludes Deutsch. 
He goes on and argues not only that philosophers who are endorsing 
(EC1) sense are mistaken when explicitly addressing the question of 
how philosophy should be done, they are also mistaken in character-
izing their own methods. Now, Deutsch rightly emphasizes the vague-
ness among advocates of the method of appealing to intuitions regard-
ing the sense of (EC) they are using. Some philosophers are not clear 
on that matter. And since this is an empirical question, i.e. whether 
philosophers use (EC1) or (EC2) sense of the evidence claim, we will 
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take a closer look at the Gettier case and see whether it can be said that 
it is a paradigm example of refutation by counterexample or, as some 
opposition to Deutsch would claim, appealing to intuitions as evidence. 
The reader should bear in mind that Gettier cases are somehow 
specifi c, according to Deutsch, being an exceptional case where philoso-
phers almost unanimously agreed that standard defi nition of knowl-
edge as justifi ed true belief is false (this too is an empirical question). 
Important question that Deutsch is addressing is how Gettier argues 
against the standard JTB theory of knowledge:
for every subject, S, and every proposition, p, if S justifi ably and truly be-
lieves that p, then S knows that p. 
Deutsch’s answer is by “presenting (alleged) counterexamples in the 
form of hypothetical cases, to the generalization” (42). In other words, 
Gettier did not use or appealed to intuitions in (EC1) sense as evidence 
against the JTB theory of knowledge in his famous cases. Instead, “Get-
tier refuted the JTB theory, if he did (…) by presenting counterexam-
ples, full stop. Whether these counterexamples are intuitive for anyone 
is a separate, and purely psychological, matter” (46). Deutsch further 
develops his ‘arguments instead of intuitions’ view by introducing the 
condition that counterexample has to fulfi ll in order to be regarded as 
successfully refuting some theory. Since, obviously, not any counterex-
ample will do, the condition of genuineness of the counterexample has 
to be satisfi ed. So, the real question that we should be asking ourselves 
is not whether the counterexamples are intuitive, but rather are Get-
tier cases genuine counterexamples. Only the latter matters in settling 
the issue of refutation of the JTB theory of knowledge. 
Deutsch’s main argument in support of his ‘arguments instead of in-
tuitions’ view consist of the two following thesis: (i) there is “no mention 
of intuitions or intuitiveness of any proposition in Gettier’s presenta-
tion” (43)—the ‘lack of explicit terminology’ thesis as I will call it—and 
(ii) Gettier refuted JTB theory because his counterexample are genu-
ine— ‘the genuineness of counterexample’ thesis. Since both theses re-
quire careful reading and precise analysis of original Gettier case, here 
is the crucial paragraph from his 1963 paper.
But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is 
true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not 
know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a 
count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man 
who will get the job. (Gettier 1963: 122)
Regarding the ‘lack of explicit terminology’ thesis, it is true, as Deutsch 
remarks, that Gettier does not explicitly use the term ‘intuition’ or it 
cognates alongside his conclusion that ‘it is equally clear that Smith 
does not know’ and so makes no explicit appeal to the premise of the 
form “It is intuitive that there is an F that is not G” (45). Addition-
ally, Deutsch claims that being ‘obvious’ or ‘clear’, terms Gettier does 
use, is different from being intuitive. Those terms usually presuppose 
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that something is true, not that they are evidence for the truth of some 
claim. Nevertheless, he admits that the lack of explicit terminology is 
not conclusive evidence to debunk the myth of the intuitive. However, 
he then shifts the burden of proof to the opposition to provide the evi-
dence that Gettier does appeal to intuitions in his cases. I do not fi nd 
this move to be very pervasive, for he must provide some rationale be-
hind this shift of the burden of proof. Not only that in this context 
the lack of explicit terminology is not conclusive evidence in favor of 
his claim, it does not contain any reason why the opposition should 
bear the burden of proof at this point. He has a long tradition of ana-
lytic philosophers who, rightly or wrongly, beg to differ so the reason 
to shift the burden of proof must be more substantiated. It is not like 
traditional philosophers were not aware that Gettier did not use the 
term ‘intuition’ explicitly. They did, and nevertheless continued to ar-
gue that it was the intuition about cases that refuted the JTB theory 
of knowledge. So, in order to reverse the dialectical situation and shift 
the burden of proof, Deutsch must present some new reason to do so. 
Moreover, just because one is not explicitly saying “it is intuitive that 
there is an F that is not G” in order to be qualifi ed as using intuition as 
evidence, it does not follow that one is not using it implicitly. Unfortu-
nately, Deutsch does not discuss this possibility in any detail.
III.
Deutsch is devoting a substantial amount of space to account for the 
second thesis, namely to develop an account of how Gettier refuted tra-
ditional JTB theory of knowledge, i.e. what makes Gettier cases and all 
similar thought experiments genuine counterexamples. Deutsch’s op-
position would address this matter by appealing to the intuitiveness of 
Gettier’s counterexample, arguing that intuitions provide evidence for 
the refutation of the JTB theory of knowledge. Deutsch thinks this view 
is mistaken and argues that Gettier presented an argument of why his 
Smith character does not know. So, Deutsch’s answer to this “evidence-
for-the-evidence” question, to use his own words, is arguments. The 
conclusion of the Gettier argument is stated fi rst: “it is equally clear 
that Smith does not know” (Gettier 1963: 122), and premises are pre-
sented after the semicolon, “for (e) is true in virtue of the number of 
coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins 
are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins 
in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get 
the job” (122).
At this point, Deutsch is presenting Jennifer Nagel’s (2012) view, as 
the representative example of the opposition to the claim that Gettier 
presented explicit arguments in his cases. She argues that Gettier did 
not offer any account of knowledge in terms of necessary conditions 
(including one that would exclude justifi ed belief that is luckily true), 
which Smith fails to satisfy, and so he is not explicitly stating why 
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Smith does not know that (e) is true. It is important in this discussion 
to emphasize that this is not ‘either–or’ choice. Namely, not all phi-
losophers would argue that Gettier cases are only about intuitions as 
evidence, and not at all about arguments, as Deutsch seems to indicate 
in several places. For instance, Malmgren (2011) explains the way that 
argument is based on intuitive judgment in the Gettier case:
Let the ‘Gettier judgement’ be the intuitive judgement that I (and many 
with me) would make about this case, if asked the appropriate question—a 
judgement that we might express by saying: ‘Smith has a justifi ed true be-
lief, but does not know, that someone in his offi ce owns a Ford.’ And let the 
‘Gettier inference’ be the inference by which we get from this judgement to 
the belief that the target theory—the theory that knowledge is justifi ed true 
belief—is false. (272)
Now, both Deutsch and Nagel’s views are results of careful reading, 
word by word, and analysis of the original text. And yet, they cannot 
agree on whether Gettier appeals to intuitions or to arguments as evi-
dence against the JTB theory. Nonetheless, they both agree that nei-
ther is presented in explicit way. How can we solve this dispute? Since 
it is not explicitly obvious that Gettier presented only an argument, 
and it is not explicitly obvious that he appealed to intuition, is it pos-
sible that this matter comes down to what seems intuitive to whom? 
It seems to me that it does, although this is not something Deutsch 
would agree on. In other words, this dispute is a matter of whether it 
seems intuitive that Gettier presented an intuitive counterexample, or 
it seems intuitive that he presented only an argument.
This is something along the lines of what Deutsch considers as a 
possible problem for his own account, namely the possibility that argu-
ing for his ‘arguments instead of intuitions’ view as evidence in hypo-
thetical examples, simply delays the question of the real ‘evidence-for-
the-evidence’, and that carrying out reasons or arguments has to stop 
at some point. And at some point intuitions would enter anyway as 
regress stoppers at the end of evidential chain. So, even if the Gettier’s 
counterexamples are not presented in terms of intuition as evidence, at 
some point the end of the chain of evidence for why counterexamples 
refuted traditional JTB theory of knowledge, or why they are genuine, 
lies in intuition. Deutsch recognizes this as the relocation problem and 
devotes chapter 3, 4 and 5 to account for it. 
Deutsch rejects the proposed possibility and claims that it is never 
about intuitions but, rather, about more arguments. If Deutsch’s op-
position would insist that “it cannot be arguments all the way down” 
(122), and that, as the answer to the ‘evidence-for-the-evidence’ ques-
tion, intuitions must come in at some point, Deutsch replies that “ar-
guments [are] further down than the myth of the intuitive would have 
us believe” (123) and that evidential levels or chains of reasons are 
fi nite, as well as philosophical texts, and at some point must come to 
an end. That is why every argument takes at least one premise for 
granted—which Deutsch calls philosophical starting points—and im-
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portant methodological note is that they “need have no special phenom-
enological or epistemological features” (124). In a nutshell, for Deutsch, 
regress stoppers are not intuitions viewed as ‘rock bottom’ evidence, 
but rather philosophical starting points, which are taken for granted, 
are not unifi ed, and vary among philosophers.
I fi nd this argument somehow problematic since he seems to be ad-
vancing the double standard of what qualifi es as regress stopper. First 
he accounts for philosophical starting points and claim that “nothing 
unifi es the claims that get taken for granted”, that “different philoso-
phers have different starting points, and the starting points are as het-
erogeneous as can be (124)”. But later argues that “’judgments about 
philosophical cases’ [i.e. intuitions about cases] names too heteroge-
neous a class for every judgment in the class to qualify as foundational 
in the sense required by foundationalist solutions to the regress prob-
lem” (127). In other words intuitions are too heterogeneous to be regard-
ed as rock bottom evidence. But on the other hand, vaguely described 
‘philosophical starting points’, which are a matter of choice for philoso-
phers according to Deutsch, and are also not unifi ed in any substantial 
way beside the fact that they are the “un-argued-for premises in a philo-
sophical argument” which “need have no special phenomenological or 
epistemological features”, can count as regress stopper (124). As I see it, 
either there is no difference between intuitions (or intuitive judgments) 
and Deutsch’s description of philosophical starting points concerning 
this matter, or the difference between the two is very sophisticated.
Deutsch analyses the possibility of intuitions being regress stopper 
via foundationalist criterion of what qualifi es something to be a foun-
dational judgment. In this regard he considers two possibilities, basic 
perceptual and self-verifying judgments, and dismisses the possibility 
that judgments about cases, i.e. intuitive judgments, could qualify as 
either of the two. First, I am puzzled as to why Deutsch dismisses the 
possibility of intuitive judgments being self-verifying judgments with-
out any further explanation. Or the way that perceptual judgments 
are not heterogeneous in a sense that intuitions are. Second, Deutsch 
argues that intuitions cannot be unifi ed on the ground of being sponta-
neous or noninferential judgments, but gives somewhat dubitable ex-
planation of why this is to. Namely, Deutsch thinks that intuitive judg-
ments might seem as nonrefl ective, or spontaneous, or noninferentitial 
because we are taking the wrong perspective on thought experiments. 
The inventor of any given thought experiment “took a considerable 
amount of ingenuity, careful thought, and inference” (98) to arrive at 
the judgments which are then often described as intuitive. This claim 
seems to be controversial on several levels, but I will focus just on one 
of them. I think it is wrong in this context to assume the correctness 
of the fi rst person perspective, because the amount of work and careful 
thought one invested in constructing the thought experiments is beside 
the point. What is relevant here is whether such thought experiments 
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elicit nonrefl ective and noninferential judgments, which are then used 
as evidence. Whether thought experiments elicit intuitions and the 
amount of work philosopher has to do in order to construct them are 
two separate questions. And the amount of careful thought and effort 
that is putted in their construction does not say anything of whether 
they elicit intuitions. And to additionally claim that Gettier himself, for 
instance, did not intuit that Smith character does not know requires 
some empirical confi rmation, which Deutsch does not provide.
Third, it is doubtful whether Deutsch’s account of philosophical start-
ing points would pass this foundational criterion that he imposes on 
intuitive judgments. And if intuitions, as heterogeneous group, must 
pass such criterion, so should Deutsch’s heterogeneous group of phil-
osophical starting points. It seems that Deutsch is willing to accept 
un-argued-for premises in philosophical arguments, and if he does not 
explain why the latter is acceptable while the former is not, I do not see 
any substantial difference to justify his rejection of intuitions. More-
over, it does not seem plausible to maintain that these un-argued-for 
premises in philosophical arguments need not to have epistemologi-
cal features, as Deutsch argues. The chain of epistemic reasons of the 
given argument end in those premises, so they certainly have to have 
some epistemic merits. My point is that if intuitions are too hetero-
geneous group and cannot be unifi ed in a way to qualify as eviden-
tial starting points, the same should apply to the Deutsch’s proposal 
of philosophical starting points, which are also heterogeneous group. 
The difference should be elaborated in more details, especially since 
he does not discuss the way that intuitions are heterogeneous—which 
can be ascribed to the fact that he does not have a theory of intuitions. 
It could be that Deutsch is not evaluating philosophical starting points 
via foundational criterion, but instead appeals to the possibility of co-
herentist solution to the regress problem. He is proposing solution to 
the relocation problem in term of hypothetical claim:
(…) if some form of coherentism about inferential justifi cation is true, then 
it is something other than resting on rock bottom evidence that justifi es our 
inferences. Some premises are justifi ed not by inference from further prem-
ises but instead by their coherence with other premises—if coherentism is 
true, that is. (127)
Deutsch is maintaining that if coherentism is true, then the demand 
of foundational justifi cation could be avoided. Unfortunately, Deutsch 
is not arguing that coherentism is true, nor is he providing any reason 
why we should accept his coherentist solution rather than foundational 
one, so his ‘arguments instead of intuitions’ account of thought experi-
ments is still facing the relocation problem. Furthermore, Deutsch is 
trying to make it immune from problems regarding the truth-irrele-
vant factors that (supposedly) affect philosophical intuitions.
Truth-irrelevant variability in the intuition that p, where this is understood 
as variability in whether different groups of people have or lack the intu-
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ition that p, will not matter in the slightest. If there is a cogent and com-
pelling argument for p, then p may perfectly well be regarded as true and 
taken as evidence for or against the truth of other, related propositions. (75)
If we agree with Deutsch that in thought experiments philosophers are 
not using intuitions, but rather arguments as evidence for p, then it 
follows that philosophers are not very profi cient in argumentation, or 
that they simply refuse to accept a good argument for the truth of p. If 
cogency and compellingness of argument for p is all that is needed for p 
to count as true, then either we have very few such arguments—which 
would be very unfortunate since philosophers do that for a living—or 
there is something else that prevents philosophers to accept something 
to be the evidence for or against some theory. For if a philosopher sets 
forth an argument for p, and given the fact that philosophers do not 
agree about much else beside the fact that traditional JTB defi nition 
of knowledge is false, then our ability to construe a good argument is 
very poor. Of course, pervasiveness of arguments, or the absence of it, 
can lie at the philosophical starting points, which are very heteroge-
neous group, as Deutsch argues. But this would not be an accurate in-
terpretation of argumentative practice among philosophers since more 
often than not these starting points are taken for granted among the 
opposition, and philosophers proceed evaluating and rebutting the ar-
guments.
There is one more important thing that should be stressed regarding 
Deutsch’s claim that arguments in thought experiments might elicit in-
tuitive judgments, but that those do not have any evidential strength. 
Additional arguments, that support those intuitive judgments do.
Judgments about thought experiments can be given argumentative support, 
even if the judgment is intuitive. Arguments for the truth of some intuitive 
judgment are arguments that reveal that the content of the judgment may 
qualify as evidence (…). (75)
No defender of the intuitional methodology would deny that intuitive 
judgments elicited by thought experiments are not often reinforced by 
supplementary arguments. The disagreement is whether the former 
has any evidential force.
As I see it, we are faced with two horns of a dilemma: either phi-
losophers have different intuitions or they are bad in argumentation. 
I would argue that the latter is less preferable option. For one thing, 
variability in intuitions existed in philosophical discussions even be-
fore the arrival of the xphi and that did not present any problem. For 
instance, internalists and externalists regarding the problem of jus-
tifi cation in epistemology, just to mention one example, engaged in 
their exchange of arguments in spite of having different intuitions 
as starting points. That did not present any problem for the ongoing 
discussions or exchange of arguments. If any of the thought experi-
ments should count against the externalism and reliabilism, it should 
have been the Lehrer’s Truetemp case (1990) and BonJour’s Norman 
202 A. Butković, The ‘Arguments Instead of Intuitions’ Account of TE
case (1984). If those thought experiments really are arguments used 
as evidence for internalism and against reliabilism, as Deutsch is sug-
gesting, why philosophers did not unanimously reject reliabilism as a 
false theory? Is it because those are not very good arguments or not 
well construed thought experiments? These would be the only viable 
options if we accept Deutsch’s view that thought experiments are not 
about intuitions. However, this certainly is not the accurate verdict 
since no one would argue that those are not good thought experiments. 
So the plausible explanation of the continuance of the disagreement 
would be the difference in philosophers’ starting intuitions regarding 
the concept of justifi cation. I am puzzled as to why these variations did 
not present any problem until xphi conducted surveys which revealed 
that folks do not share philosophers’ intuitions. In other words, philoso-
phers were fully okay with not having same intuitions with each other, 
but fully concerned about their methodology when realizing that folks 
are having the same variation.
And although Lehrer’s Truetemp case is a good thought experiment 
that received a lot of philosophical attention and is substantiated with 
additional arguments against externalism, there are still a vast num-
ber of externalists. This is a good indicator that essentially it all comes 
down to the initial intuitions philosophers have as a starting point. 
And philosophers are ok with diversity in that respect. But I do not 
think they would be ok with the other horn of a dilemma, namely that 
there are no good arguments in philosophy, or that they do not accept a 
good argument as evidence for p even if they see one.
As we can see, the trouble with intuitions is on both sides of the 
camp. Epistemological and metaphilosophical accounts of intuitions 
are, in one way or another, fl awed and the level of obscurity and am-
biguity in using the term ‘intuition’ is deeply troubling. Consequently, 
any attack on intuitions and intuitional methodology stands on equally 
troubling grounds. It is not enough simply to argue that philosophers 
are not using intuitions as evidence in their philosophical texts on the 
ground that one simply does not fi nd any appealing on intuitions in 
thought experiments, or that philosophers do not explicitly use the 
term ‘intuitive’. What is needed is some plausible empirical analysis 
of it. And it seems that empirical analysis comes down to intuitions, 
or what philosophers would say Gettier cases are about, intuitions or 
arguments.
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